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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the 
United States would no longer be party to the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on climate change mitigation.1 Trump cited his 
“America First” policy, claiming that the nonbinding agreement 
“handicaps the United States economy” to appease foreign actors 
“that have long sought to gain wealth at our country’s expense.”2 
The Agreement had been brokered and entered by the Obama 
Administration under the auspices of the United Nations.3  
 
1 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html. 
2 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, U.S. EMBASSY & 
CONSULATES IN IT. (June 1, 2017, 3:32 PM),  
https://it.usembassy.gov/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.  
3 Jonathan Easley, Trump Cements 'America First' Doctrine with Paris 
Withdrawal, THE HILL (June 2, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/336014-trump-cements-america-
first-doctrine-with-paris-withdrawal. 
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The reaction both at home and abroad was overwhelmingly 
negative.4 Local and state officials, together with business and 
university leaders, immediately condemned the withdrawal for its 
betrayal of U.S. commitments.5 Just hours after Trump made his 
announcement, these groups announced they would do “everything 
America would have done” had it remained a party.6 
Four days later, this ad hoc coalition published the “We Are Still 
In” Declaration, an “open letter to the international community” on 
where the U.S. stood with respect to the Paris Agreement.7 The 
entirety of its contents is well worth reading while bearing in mind 
the country’s federal framework: 
We, the undersigned mayors, county executives, 
governors, tribal leaders, college and university 
leaders, businesses, faith groups, cultural 
institutions, healthcare organizations, and investors 
are joining forces for the first time to declare that we 
will continue to support climate action to meet the 
Paris Agreement. 
In December 2015 in Paris, world leaders signed the 
first global commitment to fight climate change. The 
landmark agreement succeeded where past attempts 
failed because it allowed each country to set its own 
emission reduction targets and adopt its own 
strategies for reaching them. In addition, nations—
inspired by the actions of local and regional 
governments, along with businesses—came to 
 
4 See Detroit Free Press Editorial Bd., Editorial: In exiting Paris accord, 
President Trump squanders time and degrees, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 1, 
2017), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/06/01/trump-climate-
paris/363812001/.  
5 Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and 
Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), 
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html. 
6 Id. (quoting Michael Bloomberg).  
7 “We Are Still In” Declaration, WE ARE STILL IN (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-declaration [hereinafter We Are Still 
In]. 
142 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:139 
 
recognize that fighting climate change brings 
significant economic and public health benefits. 
The Trump administration’s announcement 
undermines a key pillar in the fight against climate 
change and damages the world’s ability to avoid the 
most dangerous and costly effects of climate change. 
Importantly, it is also out of step with what is 
happening in the United States. 
In the U.S., it is local, tribal, and state governments, 
along with businesses, that are primarily responsible 
for the dramatic decrease in greenhouse gas 
emissions in recent years. Actions by each group will 
multiply and accelerate in the years ahead, no matter 
what policies Washington may adopt. 
In the absence of leadership from Washington, states, 
cities, counties, tribes, colleges and universities, 
healthcare organizations, businesses and investors, 
representing a sizeable percentage of the U.S. 
economy will pursue ambitious climate goals, 
working together to take forceful action and to ensure 
that the U.S. remains a global leader in reducing 
emissions. 
It is imperative that the world know that in the U.S., 
the actors that will provide the leadership necessary 
to meet our Paris commitment are found in city halls, 
state capitals, colleges and universities, investors and 
businesses. Together, we will remain actively 
engaged with the international community as part of 
the global effort to hold warming to well below 2℃ 
and to accelerate the transition to a clean energy 




8 Id.   
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More than mere rhetoric, the Declaration was backed by an 
effort to submit a formal pledge to the United Nations committing 
its signatory cities, states, and other constituents to America’s 
obligations under the Paris Agreement—in effect, going around the 
federal government and making an international promise alongside 
other sovereign states.9  
This coalition—since formalized as the U.S. Climate Alliance 
(USCA)—now boasts “more than 3,800 leaders from America’s city 
halls, state houses, boardrooms and college campuses, representing 
more than 155 million Americans and $9 trillion of the U.S. 
economy.”10 In no uncertain terms, it asserts that Trump does not 
speak for the country, even as its chief executive.11 
For its part, the U.N. was unsure how to accept the USCA’s 
proposal, given the lack of any formal protocol for recognizing 
nonstate actors in the Paris Agreement.12 For centuries, the 
prevailing norm has been that the nation-state, represented by a 
national government, is the central actor on the international 
plane.13 While nongovernmental organizations (such as civil society 
groups and business), intergovernmental groups (like the U.N.), and 
even individuals have some role or agency, they are always 
subordinate to, and driven primarily by, the nation-state.14 
Hence why one need not support Trump’s decision to be 
perplexed or troubled by this Declaration. It presumes that 
governors, mayors, county officials, and even university presidents, 
among others, have the authority to defy their chief executive and 
remain committed to an international agreement that only he has the 
 
9 ‘We are Still in Coalition’ Launched the America’s Pledge Report During 
COP23, CLIMATE ACTION (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.climateaction.org/news/we-are-still-in-coalition-launched-the-
americas-pledge-report-during-cop23. 
10 We Are Still In, supra note 7.  
11 See id.  
12 See generally Thomas Hale, “All Hands on Deck”: The Paris Agreement and 
Nonstate Climate Action, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 12, 14 (2016).  
13 See James Fulcher, Globalisation, the Nation-State, and Global Society, 48 
THE SOC. REV. 522, 523 (2001).   
14 See Jacob L. Shapiro, International Organizations Are Tools for Powerful 
Countries, GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/international-organizations-tools-powerful-
countries/.  
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constitutional mandate to approve or terminate.15 It defies both 
international practice and the U.S. Constitution, which plainly 
reserves foreign affairs as the exclusive domain of the federal 
government.16 
Yet, while the Constitution expressly forbids states—much less 
municipalities, counties, and private entities—from forming or 
entering into legally binding agreements—especially if they conflict 
with the federal government—it is silent on whether nonbinding 
international instruments fall within the scope of this prohibition.17 
Such “soft law” emerged only a few decades ago and was never 
remotely contemplated by the Framers18; it is unclear how this new 
category of international agreement fits within a constitutional 
framework that is two and a half centuries old.   
While a high-profile example, the attempt by states and cities to 
salvage the Paris Agreement is hardly exceptional. Even thirty years 
ago, subnational foreign affairs were common and mundane enough 
to be acceptable.  
[Over] 830 cities and other municipal governments 
have established official “sister city” relationships 
with over 1,270 cities and communities in 90 other 
countries. Almost every state has sent trade missions 
to other countries to encourage exports and foreign 
direct investment, and over 40 states have 
established trade or investment offices in foreign 
countries. Over 28 cities and communities have 
 
15 See Madeleine Sheehan Perkins, A Group Representing $6.2 trillion of the US 
Economy Says They’re “Still Iin” the Paris Climate Agreement, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 5, 2017, 6:49 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/we-are-still-in-
group-represents-62-trillion-of-the-us-economy-plans-to-stay-in-paris-
agreement-2017-6. 
16 Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President, 




17 See John O. McGinnis & Peter M. Shane, Article II, Section 2: Treaty Power 
and Appointments, CONSTITUTION CTR. (last visited Feb. 5, 2021), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-
ii/clauses/346). 
18 See id.  
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declared themselves “sanctuaries” for refugees from 
Central America. Some 23 states, 14 counties, 80 
cities and the Virgin Islands have enacted various 
kinds of divestment or procurement legislation or 
ordinances directed at South Africa's apartheid 
policies. And states and municipalities have taken a 
variety of other specific actions to express or 
implement their foreign policy views.19 
While it is a truism that globalization blurs cultural and 
economic boundaries, rarely is the same said of legal and political 
dimensions.20 As some international legal scholars have observed, 
“while transnational economics has drawn the most attention,” 
globalization has presaged unprecedented growth in “political 
cooperation, migration, and communication” while eroding the 
“concept of physical territory as an organizing principle for social, 
cultural, economic, or political relations.”21 By extension, the laws 
and legal principles governing these globalizing spheres are 
impacted as well.22 The rapid proliferation and sophistication of 
nonbinding international agreements is the most pronounced 
manifestation of international law and relations 23 While these 
arrangements have largely gone unnoticed, much less faced many 
legal challenges, the fallout over the Paris Agreement has drawn 
unprecedented attention to the increasingly blurry jurisdictional 
boundaries between state and federal governments in foreign 
affairs.24  
Most emblematic of this controversy was the 2019 case of 
United States v. California, where the Trump Administration 
challenged California’s cap-and-trade agreement with the Canadian 
 
19 Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 
AMERICAN J. INT’L. L. 736, 822 (1989). 
20 See Taavet Hinrikus, The Fall and Rise of Global Borders, WORLD ECON. F. 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/fall-and-rise-global-
borders.  
21 Julian G. Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 210, 212 (2013).  
22 See id. at 223–24.  
23 See Michael J. Glennon & Robert D. Sloane, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: 
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 35 (2016). 
24 Shear, supra note 1, at 1.  
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province of Quebec, on the grounds that it violates several foreign 
affairs powers exclusive to the federal government.25 Described as 
“uncharted territory” by legal observers, the case brought to light a 
practice that will likely increase in the coming decades.26 The forces 
of globalization will continue to blend and erode cultural and 
economic boundaries. States and even cities will have unparalleled 
global connectivity, upending established political and jurisdictional 
limitations through both formal and informal agreements.27  
Even the COVID-19 pandemic, with all its disruptions to global 
travel, trade, and cooperation, failed to fully dampen this trend. In 
April 2020, as coronavirus infections began to spike in the U.S., 
Maryland procured 500,000 test kits from South Korea through 
negotiations involving “high level state officials” and the South 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.28 The same year, Florida moved 
towards creating an “intergovernmental structure” between its 
health agency and the Canadian health department to purchase 
cheaper prescription drugs from Canada.29 These are just two 
examples of state engagement abroad that managed to receive media 
attention; as this Note will reveal, such practices are so common and 
tacitly acceptable that they rarely garner any publicity, much less 
controversy or legal challenge.   
Notwithstanding the surprising commonality of such 
arrangement, this Note will explore whether state and local 
governments in the United States have the power to conduct foreign 
 
25 United States of America v. State of California et. Al., No. 2:19-cv-02142-
WBS-EFB (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Filed Oct. 23, 2019). 
26 Ellen M. Gilmer, Trump’s Latest California Swipe Wades Into Murky Legal 
Territory, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/trumps-
latest-california-swipe-wades-into-murky-legal-territory.  
27 See Tripti Lamba & Harmeet Malhotra, Role of Technology in Globalization 
with Reference to Business Continuity, 1 GLOBAL J. OF ENTERPRISE INFO. SYS. 
70, 71 (2009).  
28 Lillian Reed, Who is Yumi Hogan? Maryland’s First Lady Helped Secure 
Coronavirus Tests from Her Native South Korea, BALT. SUN (Apr. 20, 2020, 
8:29 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-pol-who-is-yumi-
hogan-20200420-20200420-k5kivvix4fgkvbgdzrpop7bfhe-story.html. 
29 John Haughey, Canadian Drug Import Plan in Florida Draws Legal 
Challenge From Pharmaceutical Industry, WASH. EXAM’R (Nov. 25, 2020, 9:00 
AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/canadian-drug-import-
plan-in-florida-draws-legal-challenge-from-pharmaceutical-industry. 
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relations independently of the federal government. Part I explores 
how Subnational Foreign Relations (SFR)—known variably as 
“paradiplomacy” or “glocalization30—fit within the U.S. federal 
framework, both constitutionally and customarily. Part II examines 
how the courts have scrutinized SFR in all its manifestations, 
striking it down in some forms and circumstances, and allowing 
them in others. Part III looks at the political response, particularly 
by Congress and the Executive, as well as by state and local 
officials. Part IV will compare how other countries address the use 
of such “soft law” by their subnational entities. Part V analyzes how 
subnational foreign relations operate within international legal 
norms and principles. Finally, Part VI will consider how 
governments at all levels rely on informal or nonbinding 
international agreements to further their interests and those of their 
constituents, whether in response to pressing challenges like climate 
change or as part of routine affairs of state. 
This Note will conclude that subnational entities in the U.S. can 
and should have relations with foreign governments and entities. 
Contrary to popular belief, states and even cities are permitted far 
more legal and political flexibility to fulfill their interests vis-à-vis 
the international community. Subnational Foreign Relations can and 
do operate within the reasonable limits set by the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress, and the judiciary. The forces of globalization—which had 
just begun sprouting when the Constitution was ratified—warrant 
redefining the federalist framework adequate with the realities and 
challenges of the twenty-first century.  
II. SUBNATIONAL FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 
U.S. FEDERAL SYSTEM 
A. Foreign affairs in the U.S. Constitution 
Section 10 of the Constitution begins by placing explicit limits 
on state action abroad. “No State shall enter into any Treaty, 
 
30 Samuel Lucas McMillan, Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Sep. 26, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.460 
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Alliance, or Confederation,”31 nor shall they “enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power” 
without the consent of the federal government, namely Congress.32 
Barring Congressional approval, U.S. states are also prohibited from 
levying duties or tariffs on imports or exports.33  
Further, the Treaty Clause confers upon the President the 
“[power], by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present 
concur…”34 As evidenced by the saga of the Paris Agreement, the 
President’s foreign affairs power has long been broadly construed 
as allowing so-called “executive agreements” without the Treaty 
Clause process.35 (Indeed, President Biden re-entered the climate 
accord with as much ease as President Trump had withdrawn from 
it.)36 The President is also granted exclusive responsibility for 
receiving ambassadors and “other public ministers” of foreign 
states.37 
Additionally, there are implicit doctrines that further distinguish 
state and federal powers on the international plane. The Dormant 
Foreign Affairs Preemption (also known as the Foreign Affairs 
Doctrine) prohibits states from passing laws that conflict with the 
federal government’s exclusive authority to conduct foreign 
affairs.38 Similarly, the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
preempts states from passing laws that interfere with Congress’ 
express constitutional power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations.”39 
Louis Henkin, one of the most influential contemporary scholars 
of international relations and U.S. foreign policy, acknowledges that 
 
31 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
32 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
33 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
34 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
35 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 390, 391 (1998).  
36 H.J. Mai, U.S. Officially Rejoins Paris Agreement On Climate Change, NPR 
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/19/969387323/u-s-officially-
rejoins-paris-agreement-on-climate-change.  
37 U.S. CONST., art. II., § 3. 
38 Aaron Messing, Nonbinding Subnational International Agreements: A 
Landscape Defined, 30 THE GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 173, 179 (2017). 
39 Id. at 183. 
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while the “language, the spirit, and the history of the Constitution” 
exclude states from foreign affairs, constitutional theory does not 
render states wholly “irrelevant or insignificant.”40 Rather, state 
policies, actions, and interests directly and indirectly shape national 
foreign policy.41  
To that end, states have a variety of both formal and informal 
mechanisms through which they engage on the international plane. 
The Constitution does not define or distinguish between a treaty, 
alliance, confederation, or compact.42 Nor is it clear whether 
comparable classes of instruments—such as an agreement, protocol, 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), or pact, among others—fit 
in this framework.43 Such ambiguity has created an environment 
wherein state-foreign relations thrive in many forms.  
B. Subnational Foreign Relations in Practice 
International agreements between subnational units and foreign 
entities take many forms, some differing only semantically, others 
not even entailing formal agreements of any kind. Hence this Note 
uses the broad term “Subnational Foreign Relations” (SFR) to 
describe any and all means by which states, cities, and private actors 
participate in the international plane.  
SFR manifests in at least five forms: (1) near-binding 
arrangements (NBA); (2) Memoranda of Understanding (MOU); (3) 
third-party representation, (4) unilateral declarations; and (5) 
foreign-state interactions (FSI). 44  Each differs in substance, 
purpose, methodology, and level of political and judicial scrutiny, 
albeit with some overlap.45 All share an informal, extra-legal basis 
 
40 Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 
(3d ed. 2002). 
41 Id.  
42 Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Constitution Mean by 
“Agreements” and “Compacts”?, 3 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 453, 453 (1936).  
43 See LEGAL SIDEBAR, CRS REPORT AND ANALYSIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
ON STATES’ EFFORTS TO “UPHOLD” THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2017); see also 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (Federal 
government may speak with “one voice” in regulating commerce with foreign 
countries). 
44 Messing, supra note 38, at 185. 
45 See id. at 194.  
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reflecting a legal and political milieu that is vague and uncertain 
towards SFR generally. 
1. Near-Binding Arrangements  
By definition, agreements under this category skirt closely with 
the sort of legally binding agreements explicitly prohibited by the 
Constitution.46 They are almost binding in that they are backed not 
by a legal obligation per se, but by “tangible political pressure” 
placed on each party to fulfill their respective commitments.47 The 
most emblematic example is the Conference of Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Governors and Premiers (GSGP), comprised of the chief 
executives of eight U.S. states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) and two 
Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec).48 The GSGP was formed 
with the explicit purpose of working “as equal partners to grow the 
region’s $6 trillion economy and protect the world’s largest system 
of surface fresh water.”49 
The GSGP also serves as the secretariat of the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Agreement.50 This “good-
faith agreement” was signed in 2005 to further the goals of the 1985 
Great Lakes Charter, under which the parties coordinate their efforts 
to preserve and manage the Great Lakes they each border.51 The 
parties were bound to fulfill their duties by nothing more than “good 
faith,” and at least once annually were to review their progress and 
advise one another on implementation.52 In 2008, the Great Lakes–
St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact was ratified by 
the U.S. federal government to bind the states to the Great Lakes 
Agreement—but not their Canadian counterparts, which maintain 
their obligations through the Agreement and any implementing 
provincial legislation made therefrom.53 Hence, this complex and 
 
46 Id. at 185.  
47 Id. at 185–86.  
48 Id. at 186. 
49 History, GREAT LAKES ST. LAWRENCE GOVERNORS & PREMIERS, 
https://www.gsgp.org/about-us/history/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) [hereinafter 
GSGP]. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 See id. 
53 See id.  
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 151 
 
interwoven series of arrangements—made over the span of nearly 
forty years—is near binding in that the foreign parties remain 
committed for nonlegal reasons, such as goodwill and a mutual 
interest in sustaining a vital and shared water resource.54 
The GSGP has also served as the forum for numerous other 
collaborative initiatives, such as promoting tourism and developing 
uniform maritime standards for shipping. In 1990, it opened a 
“shared” trade office in Toronto, Canada that was the first to 
represent business interests across multiple states.55 Several more 
offices were  launched between 1992 and 2003 in Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, South Africa, Australia, and China.56 Since 2015, many 
more have been launched in Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
United Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Korea, and most recently 
Israel; trade missions are scheduled in 2021 in Brazil, Colombia, 
Japan, and South Korea.57 As of 2021, the GSGP’s trade network 
reaches 91 countries on six continents.58 These American and 
Canadian subnational units continue to cooperate across borders and 
the world on numerous shared interests—without any discernable 
legal or political challenge.59 
2. Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
An MOU is only one degree lower in authority than a near-
binding agreement, relying on political pressure and good faith to be 
fulfilled, but with fewer specific commitments and duties.60  
A quintessential MOU is the Global Climate Leadership 
Memorandum of Understanding, also known as the “Under2 MOU” 
for its central goal of lowering emissions to mitigate global warming 
to 2°C by the year 2050.61 Not unlike the U.S. Climate Alliance, it 
is explicitly pertains to subnational governments, boasting a 
community of 220 governments of all levels of political authority; a 
 
54 See generally GSGP, supra note 49.  
55 GSGP, supra note 40. 
56 Id.  
57 News, GREAT LAKES ST. LAWRENCE GOVERNORS & PREMIERS, 
https://gsgp.org/projects/international-trade/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2021). 
58 Id.  
59 See generally id. 
60 Messing, supra note 38.  
61 Under2 Coalition , THE CLIMATE GROUP, 
https://www.theclimategroup.org/under2-coalition (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).  
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map of signatories and “endorsers” shows a patchwork of countries, 
regions, provinces, and municipalities spanning six continents 
(including several U.S. states and cities).62 Yet the four-page MOU 
makes clear it is “neither a contract nor a treaty.”63 Rather, the 
“[p]arties each have their own strategies to implement and achieve 
their goals and targets,” and agree broadly to cooperate and 
collaborate across a range of areas, from sharing methods to reduce 
pollution to exchanging ideas and technology for mitigating climate 
change.64 
As opposed to the near-binding Great Lakes Agreement, which 
establishes specific initiatives and projects, the Under2 MOU is 
essentially a set of guidelines backed by a symbolic expression of 
solidarity towards a shared goal.65 Goodwill, good faith, and mutual 
interests are still motivating factors, but there is little in the way of 
political pressure, much less legal binding.66 
Two other subnational MOUs bear out their typical reliance 
upon the initiative of each party. In the early 2000s, California 
promulgated separate MOUs with the German landers (states) of 
Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia.67 Each MOU aimed for 
cooperation in promoting and developing commercially and 
technologically viable green technology.68 Neither agreement fully 
materialized, for the simple reason that their goals were never 
fleshed out, let alone implemented and institutionalized, by either of 
the parties.69 Consequently, once the political leaders who 
negotiated the MOUs left power, these arrangement essentially left 
with them.70  
 
62 Id.; States and Regions, THE CLIMATE GROUP, 
https://www.theclimategroup.org/our-work/states-and-regions-under2-coalition 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
63 Global Climate Leadership Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), UNDER2 
COAL (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) 
https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/under2-mou-with-
addendum-english-us-letter.pdf. 
64 Id.  
65 See id.  
66 See Messing, supra note 38, at 187. 
67 Id. at 189. 
68 Id.  
69 See id. at 189-90 
70 See id. at 190.  
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By contrast, a substantially similar MOU between Wisconsin 
and Bavaria in 1998—aimed at establishing “joint projects” to foster 
public-private partners in environmental management systems—
was broadly successful, not only in “[achieving] its original 
objectives,” but in facilitating several other initiatives that were 
developed in subsequent years.71 This effectiveness was due to 
several reasons, including cultural affinity—Wisconsin delegates 
played up the state’s large population of German ancestry—support 
from nonstate actors such as businesses, and each party’s leadership 
working quickly to implement the necessary legal and regulatory 
changes.72 Both sides were driven by genuine enthusiasm, with “key 
bureaucrats” utilizing their skills and personal rapport to advance 
the MOU.73  
While the foregoing examples show MOUs as characteristic 
creatures of soft law—i.e., lacking any means of enforcement—such 
arrangements reflect the many tools and method that seek to achieve 
mutual goals without relying on the blunt instrument of state-backed 
law. The same informal, noncommittal agreements that make MOUs 
toothless—and therefore largely under the radar of courts and 
legislatures—also provide the flexibility for subnational entities to 
engage in foreign relations without coming into conflict with the 
Constitution.  
3. Third Party Representation 
This category of SFR is often superficially similar to an NBA or 
MOU except that “the formation and governance of the 
commitments [is taken] out of the hands of the subnational 
governments” and instead placed with a third party, which also has 
an administrative or implementing role.74 In that respect, TPR is 
most characteristic of globalization’s ability to blur boundaries 
between governments, civil society, and the public.75    
 
71 Id. at 189–90. 
72 HOLLEY ANDREA RALSTON, SUBNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND GERMANY, 85–86, 88-89, (Edward Elgar Pub. ed. 2013). 
73 See id. at 84-85, 88-89, 104 (describing strategies used by individuals whose 
work to were integral to MOUs). 
74 Messing, supra note 38, at 190.  
75 Id.  
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A case in point is the International Zero-Emission Vehicle 
Alliance (ZEV Alliance), which, while comprised of national, 
subnational, and municipal governments, is operated by a nonprofit 
organization: The International Council on Clean Transportation 
(ICCT). ZEV Alliance also receives some funding from private 
foundations.76 Members endeavor to support one another in 
promoting the adoption of zero emission vehicles. Each member 
also commits itself to do whatever it can within its jurisdiction to 
meet this goal.77 The ICCT serves as ZEV Alliance’s secretariat and 
provides reports and publications to member governments.78  
The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy 
(GCoM) is the result of a merger of two transnational coalitions: 
The Compact of Mayors, a group of mayors and city officials from 
across the Americas, and the Covenant of Mayors, a 
contemporaneous association of municipal leaders from across the 
European Union.79 Membership is contingent on the city making 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement 
climate change adaptation and mitigation.80 The GCoM does not 
develop new standards or commitments of its own but serves as a 
transparent platform through which cities can track and support one 
another’s progress.81 Cities that meet their goals receive an official 
seal from the GCoM, though those falling short incur no express 
penalty (other than perhaps some lost glory or standing).82  
Sister Cities International (SCI), a nonprofit organization based 
in Washington, D.C., seeks to forge and facilitate partnerships 
between U.S. and foreign municipalities, namely through sister-city 
 
76 International Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance (ZEV Alliance), UNEP, 
http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/International_Zero-
Emission_Vehicle_Alliance_(ZEV_Alliance) (last visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
77 Press Release, ZEV Alliance, International ZEV Alliance Announcement 
(Dec. 3, 2015) (on file with author). 
78 See Messing, supra note 38, at 190. 
79 About Us, GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY, 
www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
80 Join Us, GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY, 
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/join-us/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).  
81 Messing, supra note 38, at 191. 
82 Id.  
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agreements.83 Its network includes over 2,000 cities, states, and 
counties across more than 140 nations.84 SCI accomplishes its work 
through a variety of activities and initiatives, such as showcasing the 
artwork of students from different member cities, hosting student 
exchanges, and holding summits and conferences for city 
residents.85 
Tellingly, many forms of SFR pertain to the environment, 
particularly climate change. This reflects the crux of subnational 
cooperation at the international: That some issues are too big, or too 
politically and legally diffuse, to be handled by, or entrusted to, one 
national entity. 
4. Unilateral Declarations  
Unlike other types of SFR, unilateral declarations (UDs) do not 
involve direct engagement with a foreign entity.86 Instead, they 
express a subnational government’s positions, policies, or actions 
with respect to an international issue.87 UDs manifest in a variety of 
ways, from statements of solidarity with a cause or community, to 
articulations of disagreement with the foreign policy or action of the 
national government.88 In all forms, universal declarations aim to 
“raise public consciousness, stimulate public discussion, and 
persuade or influence the federal Government to consider or 
reexamine particular policies,” especially with respect to human 
rights.89  
Notable examples of UDs include Massachusetts announcing 
sanctions against Burma (Myanmar) over human rights abuses; 
Takoma Park, Maryland declaring itself a “nuclear free zone” (just 
before Congress failed to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty); and San Francisco (soon followed by Boston and 
Chicago) unilaterally implementing provisions of the Convention on 
 
83 About Us, SISTER CITIES INT’L, https://sistercities.org/about-us/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2021). 
84 Id. 
85 What We Do, SISTER CITIES INT’L, https://sistercities.org/what-we-
do/programs/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).  
86 See Messing, supra note 38, at 192.   
87 See id.  
88 Bilder, supra note 19, at 826. 
89 Id.  
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the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), after the U.S. rejected its adoption. (Dozens of cities, 
counties, and states have since followed suit with their own declared 
implementation of CEDAW.)90 
Most UDs are symbolic and therefore avoid public, political, 
legal pushback—even when conflicting with official federal policy. 
A high-profile exception was Massachusetts’ sanctions against 
Burma, which the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously struck down on 
the grounds that it interfered with a similar federal act, and thus 
encroached on the foreign affairs powers of Congress and the 
President.91 Otherwise, UDs that are narrowly tailored to policies 
within the purview of the state or city are at least tacitly allowed.92 
When challenge, courts uphold UDs that merely “mimic 
international doctrine” without implicating any international action 
(such as sanctions);93 thus, the legality of UDs, as with so many 
other types of SFR, remains largely ambiguous.94 
Also uncertain is whether UDs come under First Amendment 
guarantees of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and the right 
to petition the government. The flurry of state and city 
proclamations in support of international climate treaties, like the 
Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, went largely unchallenged, 
even as they led to the establishment of formal international 
platforms for subnational participation, such as the Non-State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) and the aforementioned Global 
Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy.95 
5. Foreign-State Interactions 
While the term “Foreign-State Interactions” could arguably be 
interchangeable with Subnational Foreign Relations, it is used in this 
Note as a “catch-all” for any connection between a subnational unit 
 
90 Cities for CEDAW, Resources: Sample Resolutions, Ordinances and 
Executive Directives, CITIES FOR CEDAW, http://citiesforcedaw.org/resources/. 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
91 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000).  
92 Shanna Singh, Brandeis’s Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities as the New 
Laboratories of International Law, 37 GEO WASHI. INT’L L. REV. 537, 541, 550, 
552, (2005). 
93 Id. at 548-49, 551-52.  
94 See id. at 551-52.  
95 Messing, supra note 38, at 193-94.  
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and foreign entity that fails to fit neatly into a single category. Such 
relationships are generally characterized by their “soft” nature—
lacking a formal agreement, framework, or mechanism—and/or by 
their manifestation solely through personal or economic ties 
between actors of both jurisdictions.96 FSI is often facilitated by 
private forces such as nonprofits, chambers of commerce, 
businesses, media, civil society groups, and even specific 
individuals.97  
A quintessential example is the previously mentioned deal on 
COVID-19 test kits between Maryland and South Korea. 
Dissatisfied with the Trump Administration’s handling of the 
pandemic, particularly the slow distribution of desperately-needed 
diagnostic equipment, the administration of Republican Governor 
Larry Hogan looked abroad for assistance—namely by utilizing the 
foreign ties of his Korean-born wife Yumi Hogan.98 Maryland’s 
First Lady, lacking any political or diplomatic background, made a 
personal appeal to South Korea’s ambassador in Korean, stressing 
the “special relationship” between her adopted state and native 
country.99 Several other “high-level state officials” took part in the 
negotiations, which Governor Hogan dubbed “Operation Enduring 
Friendship.”100 The nearly month-long effort culminated in the 
purchase of half a million test kits by Maryland’s government from 
a Korean firm.101 Hogan announced the deal alongside a high-
ranking official from South Korea’s foreign ministry; the South 
Korean flag was displayed with those of the U.S. and Maryland.102 
 
96 Hard Law/Soft Law, ECCHR, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-law-
soft-law/ (last visited Feb 14. 2021).  
97 See Tanja A. Börzel, Private Actors on the Rise? The Role of Non-State 
Actors in Compliance with International Institutions, 2000/14 MPI COLLECTIVE 
GOOD PREPRINT, Apr. 2001, at 1-2. 
98 Pamela Wood & Luke Broadwater, Maryland Secures 500,000 Coronavirus 
Tests from South Korea; Hogan’s Initiative Sparks Criticism from Trump, BALT. 
SUN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-hogan-
testing-20200420-atxs3grvbjdgphzzt4tfhuhnbm-story.html. 
99 Lilian Reed, Who is Yumi Hogan? Maryland’s First Lady Helped Secured 
Coronavirus Tests From Her Native South Korea, BALT. SUN (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-pol-who-is-yumi-hogan-
20200420-20200420-k5kivvix4fgkvbgdzrpop7bfhe-story.html. 
100 Wood & Broadwater, supra note 98. 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
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Hogan spoke glowingly of the South Korean president’s remarks 
recognizing the special partnership.103 
This was not the state’s first foray into international relations: In 
2015, the Hogans conducted several “international trade missions” 
to East Asia on behalf of Maryland.104 Two years later, First Lady 
Hogan visited South Korea to promote Maryland, its flagship 
university, and its business opportunities; she even met with South 
Korea’s first lady in the official residence of the South Korean 
president.105 Mrs. Hogan further solidified the relationship by 
establishing a sister-state relationship between Maryland and her 
home province in South Korea.106 Leveraging these personal and 
quasi-political connections proved pivotal to securing the test kits; 
it even earned Yumi Hogan South Korea’s highest civilian honor.107 
Similar, if less dramatic, examples manifest in other ways, 
usually spurred by larger global events seemingly far removed from 
state and local concern. Amid the Trump Administration’s growing 
animus towards Mexico, the Houston Chronicle stressed the 
importance of Texas-Mexico relations, highlighting the significant 
amount of bi-national trade that supports jobs in the state.108 When 
U.S.-Canada relations similarly cooled over trade disputes, one of 
Florida’s leading publications stressed the “indispensable” 
relationship between the state and America’s northern neighbor—
including the widespread investment by Canadian firms and the 
billions spent by Canadian tourists and homebuyers.109 Despite an 
 
103 Id.  
104 Reed, supra note 99.  
105 Id. 
106 Ben Leonard, Yumi Hogan, Maryland’s First Lady, Receives South Korea’s 




107 Id.  
108 Tony Payan, Texas Benefits Most in a Collaborative U.S.-Mexico 
Relationship, HOUS. CHRON. (June. 2, 2018), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Texas-benefits-most-
in-a-collaborative-12963037.php.  
109 Canada and Florida are Indispensable Business Partners. We Need to 
Expand the Relationship, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.sun-
sentinel.com/opinion/commentary/fl-op-com-fla-canada-trade-20190426-
story.html.  
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all-out trade war and diplomatic spat between the U.S. and China, 
the country’s largest state and economy, California, announced in 
2019 a “multi-organizational partnership focused on expanding 
California’s trade and investment efforts in China.”110 This network 
was the fruit of an earlier partnership between California and the 
Bay Area Council, a nonprofit focused on promoting trade relations 
between the state and China.111 
Foreign-State Interactions best reflect how the impact of larger 
geopolitical issues unavoidably seep into smaller jurisdictions that 
are otherwise far removed from the formal levers of foreign 
policy—hence the use of localized tools like newspapers or business 
associations. State, local, and nongovernment actors increasingly 
take matters into their own hands through an array of accessible 
channels, from the bully pulpit of news media to personal ties 
abroad.  
 
III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF SUBNATIONAL 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
A. Decisions Constraining Subnational Foreign Relations 
Courts have consistently held that foreign affairs are the purview 
of the federal government, which exercises “full and exclusive 
responsibility and control over our nation’s foreign relations.”112 In 
particular, the President serves as the “sole organ” of the country in 
international affairs.113 The very purpose of the Constitution, as 
opposed to the Articles of Confederation, was to ensure that the 
country could speak as “one nation,”114 particularly “in respect of 
 
110 Press Release, The State of California, Statewide Partners Bolster Trade and 
Investment Efforts in China (Sept. 10, 2019) https://static.business.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/CTIN-Press-Release-2019-f.pdf (on file with the 
California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development).   
111 Id.  
112 Bilder, supra note 19, at 823-24 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 
233 (1942)); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Writ Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
113 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).  
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
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all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our 
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.115 
Cases delineating the foreign relations powers of states are few 
and far in between.116 The earliest and best known federal decision 
on the matter is the 1840 case, Holmes v. Jennison, which arose 
when the governor of Vermont ordered the arrest and extradition of 
a Canadian fugitive absent an extradition treaty between the U.S. 
and Canada.117 In a plurality decision, the Court held that Vermont’s 
governor exceeded his authority under the Constitution, as the 
power to extradite is “confided to the federal government,”118 
specifically the President, and is “essentially national in its 
character.”119 The Court also reaffirmed that under the Constitution, 
“the states are prohibited from entering into any treaty, agreement, 
or compact, with a foreign state:”120 
Every part of [the Constitution] shows that our whole 
foreign intercourse was intended to be committed to 
the hands of the general government: and nothing 
shows it more strongly than the treaty-making 
power, and the power of appointing and receiving 
ambassadors; both of which are immediately 
connected with the question before us, and 
undoubtedly belong exclusively to the federal 
government. It was one of the main objects of the 
Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our 
foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to 
cut off all communications between foreign 
governments, and the several state authorities. The 
power now claimed for the states, is utterly 
incompatible with this evident intention; and would 
expose us to one of those dangers, against which the 
 
115 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). 
116 International Law Behind the Headlines, Episode 14: Is California’s Climate 
Accord with Quebec Illegal? With Jean Galbraith, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Oct. 
3, 2019), https://www.asil.org/resources/podcast/ep14.  
117 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 540 (1840).  
118 Id. at 588. 
119 Id. at 582.  
120 Id. at 588.  
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framers of the Constitution have so anxiously 
endeavoured to guard.121 
Holmes stands for the proposition that the Constitution 
irrefutably relegates foreign affairs exclusively to the federal 
government.122 The Court reasoned that to find otherwise would 
lead down a dangerous road of “confusion and disorder,” with 
several states exercising conflicting powers and “distinct wills” vis-
à-vis each other and the national government.123 
Yet there are some caveats in the decision. The Court concedes 
that the matter before it is a “single isolated case” of a governor 
acting unilaterally without any governing framework—be it federal 
law, a treaty, or some sort of agreement with Canada or its 
provinces.124 The controversy was narrowly centered on extradition, 
which was already well established as exclusively the purview of 
treaty law.125 Moreover, towards the end of his controlling opinion, 
Chief Justice Taney grants that agreements between states and 
foreign entities could pass constitutional muster under the right 
parameters:   
Under the second clause of the tenth article of the 
first section of the Constitution, any state, with the 
consent of Congress, may enter into such an 
agreement with the Canadian authorities. The 
agreement would, in that event, be made under the 
supervision of the United States, and the particular 
offences defined in which the power was to be 
exercised; and the national character of the persons 
who were to be embraced in it, as well as the proof 
to be required to justify the surrender. The peculiar 
condition of the border states would take away all 
just cause of complaint from other nations, to whom 
 
121 Id. at 575-76. 
122 Id. at 549-550.  
123 Holmes, 39 U.S. 450 at 578. 
124 Id. at 584.  
125 See id. at 545; see also The World’s Oldest Extradition Treaty, THE WORLD 
(June 27, 2013), https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-27/worlds-oldest-
extradition-treaty (noting tradition goes as far back as 3,000 years ago with 
extradition agreement between Egypt and Hittite Empire).  
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the same comity was not extended; and at the same 
time, the proper legal safeguards would be provided, 
for the protection of citizens of other states, who 
might happen to become obnoxious to the Canadian 
authorities, and be demanded as offenders against its 
laws. They would not be left to the unlimited 
discretion of the states in which they may happen to 
be found, when the demand is made; as must be the 
case, if the power in question is possessed by the 
states.126 
As of January 2020, Holmes appears to have been cited only 
once, in the 1917 decision in McHenry County v. Brady.127  The case 
regarded a dispute over water use and management between the 
residents of North Dakota and their Canadian neighbors.128 The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota construed the Holmes ruling as 
narrowly applying to extradition, and thus that it did not rule out 
state-foreign agreements categorically, “but only those agreements 
or compacts which affect the supremacy of the United States, or its 
political rights, or which tend in any measure to increase the political 
power of the states as against the United States or between 
themselves.”129 
It would be another century before the Court explicitly revisited 
the issue of SFR in United States v. Pink.130 There, it reaffirmed that 
foreign affairs powers were vested exclusively in the federal 
government and could be exercised even if in conflict with state laws 
or policies.131 Echoing Taney’s warning in Holmes, the Court’s 
majority warned that: 
 
126 Holmes, 39 U.S. 340 at 578-79.  
127 McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.D. 540, 544 (1917). 
128 Id. at 542.  
129 Id. at 545. 
130 U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942). 
131 Id. State Laws Affecting Foreign Relations-Dormant Federal Power and 
Preemption, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-2/state-laws-
affecting-foreign-relations-dormant-federal-power-and-preemption#fn502art2 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2021); see also Bilder, supra note 19, at 825. 
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[If] state action could defeat or alter our foreign 
policy, serious consequences might ensue. The 
nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State 
created difficulties with a foreign power Certainly, 
the conditions for “enduring friendship” between the 
nations, which the policy of recognition in this 
instance was designed to effectuate, are not likely to 
flourish where, contrary to national policy, a 
lingering atmosphere of hostility is created by state 
action.132  
 
Specifically, New York’s policy toward the state branch of a 
bank owned by the Soviet Government risked undermining U.S. 
recognition of the Soviet Union.133 (Though unmentioned in the 
1942 Pink decision, the U.S. had just entered the Second World War, 
where the Soviet Union was a key combatant and ally; it is possible 
that this context informed the Court’s restrictive approach to state 
involvement in the foreign domain.) 
Nevertheless, the Court has only once invoked the doctrine of 
Dormant Foreign Relations Power to strike down a state law that 
otherwise did not conflict with explicit federal policy.134 In its 1968 
decision in Zschernig v. Miller, it invalidated an Oregon law that 
effectively prevented inheritance by citizens of communist 
countries.135 Unlike in Pink, there was no formal federal policy or 
relationship that was infringed upon by this statute; on the contrary, 
an amicus brief by the Department of Justice stated that the law 
would not interfere with U.S. foreign relations.136 Notwithstanding 
such assurances from the federal government, nor the Court’s own 
admission that probate is wholly within the jurisdiction of states, the 
Court ruled that disadvantaging heirs in communist countries would 
 
132 Id. at 232-33 
133 Id. at 231-32 
134 State Laws Affecting Foreign Relations-Dormant Federal Power and 
Preemption, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-2/state-laws-
affecting-foreign-relations-dormant-federal-power-and-preemption#fn502art2 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2021); see also Bilder, supra note 19, at 825. 
135 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
136 Id. at 434. 
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“impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy;”137 
only the federal government could engage in such actions.138 
Since Zschernig, the Court has repeatedly struck down various 
state laws for intruding on specific foreign policies or relationships 
of the federal government. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Bd. of California, it articulated the Dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause, whereby state laws that encroach upon foreign commerce—
such as taxing “an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing 
state—are unconstitutional even if there is no federal law or 
regulation over the activity in question.139 In Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, it ruled unconstitutional a Massachusetts 
law prohibiting state residents from conducting business with 
Myanmar, finding that it conflicted with a federal statute giving the 
President authority over economic sanctions.140 In Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the Supreme Court held that U.S. states inherently “[surrender] 
certain sovereign prerogatives,” such as the power to “negotiate an 
emissions treaty with China or India …”141 
On similar grounds, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 
the Court struck down California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance 
Relief Act (HVIRA), which required all insurance companies in the 
state to publish information on policies held by persons in Europe 
from 1920 to 1945, including the names of the owners and the status 
of the policies. The law’s intention was to facilitate reparations of 
insurance policies or proceeds that had been confiscated by Nazi 
Germany.142 Citing its decisions in Zschernig, Pink, and Crosby, the 
Court reasoned that the HVIRA “[interfered] with the president’s 
ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy,” since it was 
“longstanding practice” to rely upon executive agreements with 
Germany and other European countries to resolve such claims.143 
 
137 Id. at 440. 
138 Id. at 441. 
139 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 310-
311 (1994). 
140 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. at 363; see also Japan 
Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 446 (striking down a California 
property tax on foreign-owned cargo ships under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause). 
141 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
142 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003). 
143 Id. at 419-20. 
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The Court affirmed that the President had the “lead role” in foreign 
policymaking, including the authority to execute agreements 
without Senate approval.144 
The opinion in Garamendi is notable for its dictum 
distinguishing between two forms of the Dormant Foreign Affairs 
Preemption—field preemption and conflict preemption: 
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter 
of foreign policy with no serious claim to be 
addressing a traditional state responsibility, field 
preemption might be the appropriate doctrine, 
whether the National Government had acted and, if 
it had, without reference to the degree of any conflict, 
the principle having been established that the 
Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to 
the National Government.  
Where, however, a State has acted within what 
Justice Harlan called its “traditional competence,” 
but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might 
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or 
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the 
traditional importance of the state concern 
asserted.145  
 
Applying the Garamendi standard, the Court determines 
whether a state law triggers the Dormant Foreign Affairs 
Preemption by balancing “the executive authority underlying the 
foreign policy, any historical tradition supporting the state law, and 
the degree to which the two conflict.146 The Zschernig decision is 
most illustrative of field preemption, as it concerned whether the 
state’s actions had a “direct impact on foreign relations” and 
whether it may “adversely affect the power of the central 
government to deal with those problems.”147 This standard is further 
articulated in the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision in Movsesian v. 
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Victoria Versicherung AG: That the state law must have an impact 
on foreign affairs that is “more than … incidental or indirect,” 
including displaying “a distinct political point of view on a specific 
matter of foreign policy” that is controversial or sensitive.148 In 
essence, the law is preempted if it risks putting the federal 
government in a difficult or even potentially dangerous position in 
global affairs.149 Hence the Court in Zschernig warned that 
international controversies arising out of “real or imagined wrongs” 
by a government could potentially lead to war.150  
Illuminating this standard further is Clark v. Allen, which held 
that the foreign affairs power of the federal government does not 
preempt state or local legislation that has only “some incidental or 
indirect effect on foreign countries.”151 The Court observed that 
many state laws have some bearing on the foreign domain without 
necessarily “[crossing] the forbidden line” into federal territory.152 
Examples would ostensibly include “resolutions urging nuclear 
arms control and respect for human rights [which] seem intended 
primarily to raise public consciousness, stimulate public discussion, 
and persuade or influence the federal Government to consider or 
reexamine particular policies.”153 The Court in Zschernig explicitly 
cited Clark in permitting states to engage in actions and relations on 
the world stage—albeit along ill-defined and unclear lines.154  
Based on the foregoing decisions, for any form of SFR to pass 
constitutional muster, they must meet the following criteria:  
1. Avoid conflicting with existing treaties, executive 
agreements, or federal policy; 
2. Remain within the domain of accepted state-level power;  
3. Avoid interfering with explicit federal powers or dormant 
powers (such as over foreign commerce); and 
4. Promote merely symbolic or “expressive” objectives. 
 
148 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2012).  
149 Id.  
150 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 
151 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). 
152 Id. 
153 Bilder, supra note 19, at 826. 
154 Henkin, 389 U.S. at 432.  
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Aside from the first criterion, which is relatively concrete—
relying on explicitly articulated laws and agreements—the latter 
remain underdeveloped and vague,  as evidenced by the sequence of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions attempting to delineate, case-by-case, 
what matters fall within the federal domain or potentially impact 
foreign relations. 
B. Decisions Favoring or Supporting Subnational Foreign 
Relations 
As early as 1796—less than a decade after the Constitution was 
ratified—the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the parameters of state 
and federal governments with regards to foreign policy.155 Ware v. 
Hylton centered on a Virginia law that allowed citizens of the state 
to renege on their debts to British subjects.156 The law was struck 
down because it contravened the Treaty of Paris with Great Britain, 
which obligated both countries to allow one another’s creditors to 
collect their debts.157 Laying down perhaps the earliest foundation 
for Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption, the Court primarily cited 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which holds that “all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the 
United States, shall be the Supreme law of the land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, [anything] in the Constitution, 
or laws, of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”158 The Ware 
opinion also makes repeated references to the “law of nations,” as 
international law was then known.159 On that note, the Court found 
that both federal and state governments were obligated to conform 
with the customs and practices of foreign states, which Virginia’s 
law had violated.160  
 
155 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796). 
156 Id. at 199-200. 
157 Id. at 236. 
158 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
159 Ware, 3 U.S. at 215.  
160 Id. at 266 (“[T]he acts were not for that reason void, but the State was 
answerable to the United States, for a violation of the law of nations, which the 
nation injured might complain of to the sovereignty of the Union.”); see also id. 
at 269 (“I believe there can be no doubt, but that according to the law of nations, 
even on the most modern notions of it, a sequestration merely for the purpose of 
recovering the debts, and preventing the remittance of them to the enemy, and 
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In effect, the Court privileged international law and the federal 
government’s duty to comply with it, as it would reaffirm a little 
over a century later in The Paquete Habana; The Lola.161 There, the 
Court also appears to suggest that, absent a conflict with federal law, 
a treaty, or international law, states can engage in the foreign sphere, 
either through domestic laws with international implications, or 
through direct relationships with foreign entities.162 This is also 
alluded to in the Paquete Habana decision, which found that:  
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of 
jurists and commentators who by years of labor, 
research, and experience have made themselves 
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which 
they treat.163 
 
Although Paquete Habana concerned violations of international 
law by the federal government, it reflects a consistent theme since 
Ware of privileging foreign relations and conformity to international 
norms without necessarily excluding states.164 
Two decades after the Paquete Habana decision, the Court 
reaffirmed the supremacy of treaties—and by extension 
 
thereby strengthening him, and weakening the government, would be 
allowable…”). 
161 See generally The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See Ware, 3 U.S. at 223-24 (1796) (“If Virginia as a sovereign State, violated 
the ancient or modern law of nations . . . she was answerable in her political 
capacity to the British nation, whose subjects have been injured in consequence 
of that law. Suppose a general right to confiscate British property, is admitted to 
be in Congress, and Congress had confiscated all British property within the 
United States, including private debts: would it be permitted to contend in any 
court of the United States, that Congress had no power to confiscate such debts, 
by the modern law of nations? If the right is conceded to be in Congress, it 
necessarily follows, that she is the judge of the exercise of the right, as to the 
extent, mode, and manner. The same reasoning is strictly applicable to Virginia, 
if considered a sovereign nation; provided she had not delegated such power to 
Congress, before the making of the law of October 1777 . . . .”). 
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international legal principles—in Missouri v. Holland.165 There, the 
Court addressed the federal government’s ability to enter treaties 
that abrogated powers arguably reserved for the states by the Tenth 
Amendment.166 Missouri challenged federal legislation that 
implemented a treaty with the United Kingdom banning the hunting 
of certain migratory birds, arguing that regulating game was not an 
express power of the federal government in the Constitution; thus, 
per the Tenth Amendment, the regulation of game was relegated to 
the states.167  
Citing, in part, its decision in Ware, the Court’s majority ruled 
that treaties “are as binding within the territorial limits of the States 
as they are elsewhere” in the country, and that while “the great body 
of private relations usually fall within the control of the State,” 
treaties, through the Supremacy Clause, may supersede even these 
powers.168 Consistent with the Court’s precedent, Missouri once 
again elevates America’s commitment to its international 
obligations, specifically with respect to treaties, even at the apparent 
expense of state autonomy.169  
For the purpose of this Note’s argument, however, Missouri is 
notable for Justice Holmes’ dictum that the Constitution is a living 
instrument: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United 
States, we must realize that they have called into life 
a being the development of which could not have 
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to 
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken 
a century and has cost their successors much sweat 
and blood to prove that they created a nation. The 
case before us must be considered in the light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was 
said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does 
 
165 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920). 
166 Id. at 423. 
167 Id. at 429. 
168 Id. at 434-35. 
169 Id. at 435. 
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not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in 
the Constitution. The only question is whether it is 
forbidden by some invisible radiation from the 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must 
consider what this country has become in deciding 
what that amendment has reserved.170  
 
The foregoing excerpt—read in consideration of earlier 
decisions favoring international law and comity—reasonably 
supports the proposition that the Constitution allows for Subnational 
Foreign Relations. Accepting the doctrine of an organic Constitution 
that can change in the absence of express “prohibitory words,” the 
advent of globalization, as well as inherently global problems such 
as climate change, warrants an interpretation of the Constitution that 
allows for a commensurate response.171 Even in the early nineteenth 
century, the Court found that the Constitution was intended “to be 
adapted to various crises of human affairs.”172 
Although it did not concern an agreement with a foreign power, 
the 1893 case Virginia v. Tennessee173 provides another accepted 
standard that is broadly favorable to the constitutionality of SFR.174 
There, the Compact Clause was implicated by a boundary between 
the two states that had not received any explicit congressional 
approval.175 In its review of the Virginia-Tennessee agreement, the 
Court found no violation of the Compact Clause, determining that 
there was “implicit congressional consent.”176 The Court reasoned 
that the boundary agreement did not increase the political power of 
the states such that it encroached upon the domains and powers of 
the federal government.177 Based on the Virginia decision, the 
Constitution’s prohibition of interstate agreements lacking 
congressional consent is not absolute; rather, it is conditioned on 
 
170 Id. at 433-34. 
171 Holland, 252 U.S at 433.  
172 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
173 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893). 
174 Glennon & Sloane, supra note 23, at 35. 
175 Virginia, 148 U.S at 503. 
176 Id. at 521. 
177 Id. at 519. 
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whether the agreements cover matters determined to be outside the 
ambit of state powers.178 
The Interstate Compact Doctrine that emerged from the Virginia 
decision has been relied upon by jurists, scholars, and some courts 
in testing the constitutionality of SFR.179 However, the Court itself 
has never invoked the doctrine in its assessment of SFR,180 and it 
remains an unsettled question as to whether the “Virginia standard 
applies to state compacts with foreign powers.”181 Nevertheless, 
Virginia remains key in shifting the Constitution’s “textual default 
rule” from one that regards SFR as “presumptively invalid absent 
congressional approval to one that regards them as presumptively 
valid absent congressional disapproval” (emphasis added).182 
Indeed, from Holmes to Garamendi, no judicial decision has 
ever interpreted the Constitution as categorically prohibiting states 
from conducting foreign affairs. Instead, states acting in the 
international sphere or passing legislation with international 
implications need only follow certain parameters that have gradually 
but consistently been developed since Ware—parameters that have 
yet to be fully clarified.  
By that token, it is worth revisiting the Holmes decision, Justice 
Baldwin’s opinion on the international implications of Vermont’s 
unilateral extradition of a Canadian fugitive: 
By the course which has been taken, all danger of 
interfering with the relations of the United States and 
foreign powers, either on matters of commercial 
intercourse, or diplomatic concern is avoided; such 
interference could happen only on the refusal to 
deliver up the fugitive, on the demand or request of 
the authorities of Canada; for a compliance with 
either, would rather add strength to, than tend to 
weaken the pre-existing relations of amity and 
comity between the two nations. On the other hand, 
 
178 Id. at 522. 
179 Glennon et al., supra note 23, at 281. 
180 Id.  
181 Letter from William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to 
Senator Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota (Nov. 20, 2001) (on file with the U.S. 
Department of State). 
182 Glennon et al., supra note 23, at 283. 
172 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:139 
 
if the delivery was spontaneous, and made in the true 
spirit of border peace, and mutual safety from crime, 
the boon would be the more acceptable; or if the 
authorities of the state should send the fugitive back 
whence he came, those of Canada would have no 
cause of complaint, because they had made no 
reclamation, or because Vermont was unwilling to 
incorporate among its citizens a foreigner whom his 
own government was disposed not to take back.183  
 
Justice Baldwin, and the three justices who joined his opinion, 
concedes that even if Vermont’s actions contravened the Compact 
Clause and foreign relations domain of the federal government, they 
were nonetheless invaluable both morally and practically.184 The 
state was promoting a mutually beneficial policy of crime control 
and ensuring good relations with a neighboring country that could 
later be reciprocated.185 Far from undermining the national 
government’s international standing, Vermont was helping to 
enhance it. 
Pursuant to Justice Baldwin’s view, allowing states their 
constitutional right to engage in positive foreign relations is not only 
proper but generally beneficial. This reasoning may account for why 
courts have not categorically invalidated any type of Subnational 
Foreign Relations. The coalition of subnational entities and civil 
society groups that sought to salvage the Paris Agreement is one key 
example of the merits of SFR—but far from the only one. The 
potential boon of allowing states to conduct (limited) foreign 
relations may account for why the response by the political branches 
has been even more muted than that of the judiciary. 
 
183 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 614, 619-20 (1840). 
184 Id. at 620. 
185 Id. 
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IV. POLITICAL RESPONSES 
Notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s suit against 
California,186 “the scope and extent of this recent state and local 
involvement in foreign affairs […] occasioned little reaction from 
Congress or the Executive…”187 Notably, none of the specific 
instances of Subnational Foreign Relations discussed in previous 
sections were challenged by the federal government. Even the forms 
of SFR that require express congressional approval have been 
overlooked.188 
In some instances, state actions on the international plane have 
received at least tacit support by the federal government. Congress 
explicitly drafted the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act to 
avoid conflicting with dozens of existing state and local 
antiapartheid laws across the country.189 Some years later, Congress 
left it to the states to carry out implementation of parts of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement Act, which was passed to incorporate 
several international trade agreements entered by the U.S.190 Similar 
implementation powers were granted in the ratifications of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the 
Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.191 
In 2003, Kansas concluded an agreement with Cuba, which was 
then designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. Department 
of State.192 Cuba agreed to buy $10 million of Kansas’ agricultural 
products in exchange for the state endorsing an end to the 
embargo.193 Two years later, a Kansas representative introduced a 
bill in Congress to repeal trade and travel restrictions against Cuba, 
 
186 See generally United States v. California, No. 19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
12, 2020) (order granting partial summary judgment).  
187 Bilder, supra note 19, at 823. 
188 Glennon et al., supra note 23, at 284. 
189 Id.  
190 Henkin, supra note 38, at 151; See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 
No. 103-465 (1994). 
191 Henkin, supra note 40, at 170 n.5.  
192 Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, TEXAS L. REV. (May 5, 
2009; State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
193 Hollis, supra note 192, at 185. 
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which was officially endorsed by the Lieutenant Governor of 
Kansas.194 
Any amicable arrangement between one of America’s most 
conservative states and one of its major (and officially socialist) 
foreign adversaries would be unthinkable in any context—let alone 
in post 9/11 America. Yet the Kansas-Cuba agreement garnered no 
constitutional scrutiny, public attention, or repudiation by either 
Congress or the Bush Administration.195 
Such apathy is par for the course for SFR.196 In the century 
leading up to 2009, only a handful of agreements between states and 
foreign entities were formally reviewed by Congress, of which only 
one was explicitly rejected.197 This is not for lack of opportunity: 
Since 1955, over 340 types of SFR have been created by all but nine 
states, with 200 being concluded between 1999 and 2009 alone.198 
These agreements attract so little attention that there is no official 
monitoring body or mechanism for keeping track of them—meaning 
the actual number may be far higher.199 Knowingly or not, Congress 
appears to accede to the Virginia decision’s finding of SFR as 
presumptively valid.200 
The Executive has similarly been loath to monitor, much less 
review, instances of Subnational Foreign Relations; the few times it 
has done so have only been by request. 201 Before its lawsuit against 
California in October 2019, only once did the Executive conduct a 
“sustained analysis” of any SFR: An MOU between Missouri and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba on water resource 
management.202 An assessment by the State Department—which 
considered, inter alia, the decisions in Virginia, McHenry County, 
and Holmes—concluded that the Missouri-Manitoba MOU 
“potentially implicates several constitutional doctrine” (emphasis 
 
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 2. 
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 4. 
199 Hollis, supra note 192, at 4. 
200 Id. at 39-41. 
201 Id. at 2. 
202 Press Release, Manitoba Government, Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Signed Between Manitoba and Missouri to Protect Water Resources 
(Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author). 
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added).203 The analysis found that further evaluation would be 
needed to determine whether the MOU is preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause (per the test in Crosby) and/or interferes with the 
federal government’s foreign affairs powers per Zschernig.204  
The State Department’s review of the Missouri-Manitoba MOU 
made a passing, uncited reference to a “1981 case” regarding a 
proposal between Quebec and Vermont for a shared water district.205 
There, the agency determined that the proposed agreement did not 
implicate the Compact Clause since “federal permitting procedures 
would still apply and the district’s activities would be limited to 
traditionally local functions (e.g., water service) rather than political 
functions.”206 In 2010, Quebec and Vermont concluded an MOU to 
“provide stable, clean, renewable power at a competitive price” to 
Vermont residents until 2038.207 The MOU appears to have escaped 
any judicial or political scrutiny—most likely because electrical 
service constitutes a “traditionally local” function.208  
A. United States v. California: Federal Overreach 
The Executive seems to echo the Supreme Court’s finding that 
SFR is not wholly unconstitutional but could concern broad swathes 
of activities and sectors that do not infringe on explicit political 
powers or dormant foreign affairs powers.209 Even the Trump 
Administration’s suit against California’s emissions agreement with 
Quebec did not appear to take an absolutist view against SFR.210 The 
complaint cited the familiar textual language of the Constitution—
inter alia, the Supremacy, Compact and Commerce clauses—as 
well as the decisions in Massachusetts, Barclays Bank PLC, and 
American Ins. Ass’n.211 The federal government qualified its claim 
 
203 Letter from William Howard Taft IV, supra note 181.  
204 Id. 
205 Id.  
206 Id.  
207 Press Release, Government of Québec, Governor, Premier announce 
preliminary Vermont-Hydro-Québec agreement (Mar. 11, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
208 Letter from William Howard Taft IV, supra note 181.  
209 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 74, United States v. 
California, 2:19-at-01013 (2019) (No. 219-cv-02142).  
210 Id. 
211 Id. at ¶¶ 20-31. 
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by emphasizing the agreement’s “effect of undermining the 
President’s ability to negotiate competitive international agreements 
in the area of environmental policy;”212 its potential to harm “the 
United States’ ability to manage its relations with foreign states;213 
and its “[interference] with the United States’ foreign policy on 
greenhouse gas regulation.”214 These arguments are consistent with 
the Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption established by the 
Supreme Court in Barclays Bank PLC, which the complaint cites as 
favorable to its position.215 
Yet a thorough legal analysis by Sharmila Murthy of Suffolk 
Law School found little merit to the Trump Administration’s claims, 
arguing that the complaint on several faulty premises: 216 
President Trump’s preemption argument is weak 
because he is not acting “pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress.” Congress has 
not passed legislation preempting cross-border 
emissions trading programs. In addition, California’s 
cap-and trade program is arguably consistent with 
the Clean Air Act, which covers the regulation of 
greenhouse gases and which expressly preserves the 
authority of states to implement stricter air pollution 
standards, with certain exceptions. The US Senate 
also provided the necessary consent for the United 
States to ratify the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In fact, 
in rejecting a foreign affairs challenge to state-based 
regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, 
a US District Court held that “state and local efforts 
 
212 Id. at ¶ 74. 
213 Id. at ¶¶ 75. 
214 Id. at ¶ 103. 
215 Supra note 209, at ¶ 25. 
216 Sharmila Murthy, California’s Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec: 
Surviving Constitutional Scrutiny, ENVTL. AND ENERGY L. PROGRAM AT HARV. 
L. SCH. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/californias-cap-
and-trade-agreement-with-quebec-surviving-constitutional-scrutiny/. 
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in concert with federal programs contribute to the 
UNFCCC’s ultimate objective.”217 
 
Moreover, environmental policy is not the traditional domain of 
the Executive, echoing the Department of State’s acceptance of the 
Quebec-Vermont agreement on the grounds that it reflected the 
traditional local domain of water policy.218 As Murthy observes, it 
is Congress that enacts environmental laws, typically along the lines 
of “cooperative federalism,” wherein states explicitly play a role.219 
Many of the key policies and actions related to addressing climate 
change, including zoning laws and public transportation, are carried 
out at the state and local level.220 Hence the Trump Administration 
relied on the argument that the California-Quebec agreement 
implicates national security, a fundamental and indisputable power 
of the federal government.221 But given the standards set forth in 
Garamendi and Clark, it is difficult to conclude, even facially, that 
a market-based cap-and-trade scheme falls within the national 
security domain.222 
In fact, the federal government’s argument in California risked 
undermining the “federalism and separation of powers” so central to 
Constitution—principles that are central to the Republican Party 
then in power.223 “If a Cap-and-Trade Agreement falls within the 
executive’s national security powers, then, by extension, so would 
every single state or local action to address climate change, from 
zoning decisions to investments in public transportation to changes 
in building codes.”224 Furthermore, the facts in Garamendi relied 
upon by the Trump Administration are distinguishable from those in 
 
217 Id.  
218 Letter from William H. Taft, supra note 181. 
219 Murthy, supra note 212, fn. 22. 
220 Id.  
221 Supra note 205, at ¶¶ 32, 72. 
222 Murthy, supra note 212. 
223 Preamble, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM 2016 i, i (2016), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5b1%5d-
ben_1468872234.pdf?_ga=2.5735024.292042121.1584416742-
2118454910.1584416742 (“We believe our constitutional system—limited 
government, separation of powers, federalism, and the rights of the people—
must be preserved uncompromised for future generations.”). 
224 Murthy, supra note 212. 
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California.225 The Court in Garamendi struck down a California 
statute for interfering with a matter already addressed by federal 
policy and practice.226 The California-Quebec Agreement seeks to 
address climate change through a market-based cap-and-trade 
scheme that has no antecedent in any federal agreement or policy.227 
Considering the foregoing, Trump’s best way to end the 
California-Quebec agreement would have been by persuading 
Congress to pass legislation preempting it. Otherwise, the district 
court presiding over the case would be departing from existing and 
well established precedent, “potentially [opening] the floodgates to 
litigation over the hundreds to thousands of cross-border agreements 
that states and cities have entered into on a myriad of issues.”228 
Given the hundreds of examples of SFR that have been concluded 
over the last several decades—virtually all of them under the radar 
of both Congress and the Executive, as well as the public—a 
decision favoring the Trump Administration would have upset a 
cornerstone of local and state activity.  
Such a decision would also have been contrary to longstanding 
acceptance by the political branches that SFR is not only harmless, 
but valuable. It was the Republican Eisenhower Administration that 
initiated the now-ubiquitous sister-city agreements to foster cultural 
and commercial ties following the discord of the Second World 
War.229 State trade missions abroad promote “American exports, 
[encourage] foreign direct investment in the United States, and 
[stimulate] domestic employment,” while state offices oversee 
encourage tourism.230 Given its “America First” policy, the Trump 
Administration would have ostensibly not wanted to risk 
undermining or severing the hundreds of state and local ties and 
agreements that have benefited Americans across the nation. 
Many of these questions will remain unsettled for the time being. 
In July 2020, the federal district court for the Eastern District of 
 
225 Id. 
226 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401. 
227 Murthy, supra note 212. 
228 Id.  
229 Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, 
and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L. J. 1564, 1649 (2006); 
United States v. California, 444 F. Supp. 3d. 1181, 1182 (2019). 
230 Glennon et al., supra note 23, at 285. 
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California ruled that California’s cap-and-trade program with 
Quebec was not preempted by the Foreign Affairs Doctrine nor 
violative of the Treaty and Compact Clauses of the Constitution.231 
An appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed by the Trump 
Administration September 2020 remains pending as of April 
2021.232 With Trump’s departure and his successor’s favorable 
attitude towards climate change action, the issues raised by U.S. v. 
California will likely be shelved—leaving yet another aspect of 
Subnational Foreign Relations uncertain.  
If it is any consolation to Trump and his supporters, the United 
States is far from the only nation grappling with how or whether 
SFR fit within its constitutional framework. 
 
V. SUBNATIONAL FOREIGN RELATIONS IN OTHER 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS 
Sister-city agreements, by their very nature, would seem the 
least likely of any Subnational Foreign Relations to garner national, 
much less international, controversy. Yet through just such an 
agreement, the capital and largest city of the Czech Republic, 
Prague, caused an unlikely diplomatic rift between the Central 
European country and the world’s largest nation and rising 
superpower.233 In 2016, city officials established a sister-city 
relationship with Beijing, China; this included recognition of the 
Chinese government’s “One China” policy, which holds that the de 
facto sovereign nation of Taiwan is part of China.234 The agreement 
was established just one month before a state visit to the Czech 
Republic by the Chinese president—indicative of how national 
interests can be linked to even local-level SFR.235 In 2019, a new 
municipal administration in Prague called for the One China 
 
231 United States v. California, 444 F. Supp. 3d. 1181, 1182 (2019). 
232 Id. 
233 Rob Schmitz, Czech-Chinese Ties Strained As Prague Stands Up To Beijing, 
NPR (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:05 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/30/774054035/czech-chinese-ties-are-affected-as-
prague-stands-up-to-beijing.  
234 Id.  
235 Id.  
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provision to be removed from the agreement, arguing that a “sister-
city agreement should not include things that are not related to the 
cities’ relationship.”236 
In response, Beijing swiftly terminated the sister-city agreement, 
while the Chinese government targeted Prague for punishment; most 
notably, a planned tour of China by the Prague Philharmonic 
Orchestra—its largest-ever project—was cancelled after over two 
years and $200,000 in preparations.237 The Czech president 
personally appealed to his Chinese counterpart that he disagreed 
with Prague’s decision and urged the two countries to continue 
maintaining their ties and investment agreements.238 Meanwhile, the 
city’s actions became a worldwide cause célèbre for critics of the 
Chinese government’s heavy-handed approach to the One China 
policy.239 
This unlikely episode is very telling of how subnational entities 
can and do exercise outsized influence in a globalized world. The 
term “local internationalism” has been used to describe the 
phenomenon of “state and local officials … [venturing] into an 
international arena that, until comparatively recently, they regarded 
as forbidden territory.”240 The “globalizing forces” that have eroded 
national boundaries have given officials of even small subnational 
polities the chance to go head-to-head with counterparts that 
exercise far greater power and significance.241 Consider that 
Prague’s municipal administration governs roughly 1.5 million 
people—compared to over 1.5 billion under the jurisdiction of the 
Chinese government. Yet the former managed to attract the attention 
and ire of the latter, at relatively little cost to itself.242  
However, lest the critics and doubters of SFR point to the 
Prague-Beijing kerfuffle as validating their concerns, the Czech 
Republic is not a federal state, and thus arguably lacks the balanced 
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framework articulated in previous sections of this Note.243 It is best 
to compare the situation of SFR in the United States to other federal 
systems that bear a similar framework of shared powers between 
central and subnational agreements.  
Aside from Mexico, Canada, and Germany—for which this Note 
has already provided examples of established SFR with U.S. 
counterparts—the subnational entities of Austria, Belgium, the 
Russian Federation, and Switzerland have also concluded 
international agreements.244 By contrast, the federal governments of 
India and Malaysia provide no capacity for their states to enter 
foreign agreements, although tellingly, both nations regularly 
consult with state governments directly with respect to national 
treaties and/or their implementation.245 
On the other side of the coin is Belgium, whose constitutional 
provisions on foreign law are “virtually without precedent.”246 The 
Belgian Constitution is unique in allowing certain treaties to be 
entered only by subnational governments, and provides for “mixed 
treaties” that require both national and subnational consent.247 This 
was demonstrated most dramatically in the 2016 “Walloon CETA 
saga,” in which the parliament of Wallonia, one of the two major 
autonomous regions of Belgium, initially blocked the national 
government from signing the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the European Union (EU) and 
Canada.248 CETA could only be concluded if all EU member states 
approved it.249 In effect, this subnational entity of roughly 3.6 
million people—part of only one of the 27 countries comprising the 
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512-million-strong EU—managed to derail a massive agreement 
that took seven years to negotiate.250  
Australia and Austria also stand out in allowing their subnational 
entities to pass implementing legislation for treaties entered by the 
national government.251 While much rarer in practice, Canada’s 
constitution similarly provides for certain federal treaties to be 
implemented solely by provincial governments.252 While a separate 
power from the ability to carry out SFR, these practices/provisions 
arguably give weight and legitimacy to the subnational entities of 
these countries when they engage with the international plane.   
Furthermore, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland are unique for 
their constitutions’ explicit language conferring subnational entities 
with foreign relations powers—albeit within very tight constraints. 
The Austrian Constitution allows the country’s länder to make 
treaties with foreign entities on issues within their “independent area 
of competence.”253 However, the federal government must be 
informed of the länder’s intention to conclude a treaty before it can 
begin negotiations.254 Further, this power is greatly circumscribed 
by the narrow scope of matters deemed within the exclusive purview 
of länder.255 Germany’s constitution similarly allows its first-order 
subnational entities (also called länder) to make treaties within their 
“exclusive legislative jurisdiction,” albeit only with federal 
consent.256 Among the few subject matters permitted for German 
SFR are those concerning culture.257 Perhaps reflecting a shared 
Germanic political tradition, the Swiss Constitution also has 
provisions allowing the country’s cantons to engage in SFR within 
their “scope of … competencies,” again only with federal 
approval.258   
Brazil, one of the largest federal republics in the world, is most 
comparable to the U.S. in its approach to SFR. As in U.S. law, 
treaties are the explicit purview of the federal government, with both 
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the executive and the legislature playing a role.259 Like the U.S., 
there exists a “twilight zone” between international treaties and 
other international instruments due to uncertainty about any 
substantive difference between them.260 Since Brazilian states and 
cities can exercise any power not explicitly prohibited by the 
Brazilian Constitution, this would ostensibly include the power to 
negotiate “contracts” with foreign entities, “because they are not 
treaties, and because their nature under the Constitution has not been 
challenged, these contracts do not fall within the categories of the 
treaty-making process.”261 However, Article 53 of the Brazilian 
Constitution gives the federal Senate of Brazil the power to 
“authorize foreign transactions of a financial nature, of interest to 
the Republic, the States, the Federal District, the Territories, and the 
Municipalities.”262 This essentially combines the Foreign 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states 
from encroaching on federal responsibility for commerce with 
foreign nations, with the Compact Clause’s requirement of 
congressional approval (be it explicit or implied).263 The key 
difference is that Brazil’s national government ultimately has full 
jurisdiction to conduct foreign relations on behalf of its states and 
municipalities, even concerning the sort of cross-border agreements 
that are practically a given in the U.S.264 Brazil’s subnational entities 
lack the “international personality to enter into relationships with 
foreign countries.”265 It still remains to be seen how this framework 
will address France’s announcement in December 2019 of a 
partnership with several Brazilian states to preserve the Amazon 
rainforest—sought with the explicit intention of bypassing Brazil’s 
recalcitrant federal government.266 
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In any event, the advent of globalization has left virtually no 
nation untouched by the subsequent perforation of national borders. 
As worldwide initiatives like the ZEV Alliance, the Global 
Covenant of Mayors, and Sister Cities International make clear, 
Subnational Foreign Relations will very likely continue 
proliferating in various forms, especially in the face of diffuse 
challenges like climate change. Ironically, the rise of nationalism, 
economic protectionism, and isolationism—as seen in the U.S. and 
Brazil—makes it all the more likely that subnational polities within 
these anti-globalist governments will attempt to circumvent them 
through SFR of one kind or another. 
 
VI. SUBNATIONAL FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Tacit Acceptance and Allowance 
If decisions like Ware and Paquete Habana enshrine U.S. 
commitments to international law, then it stands to reason that the 
legality and constitutionality of Subnational Foreign Relations must 
also be consistent with international legal norms and principles.  
At first glance, SFR does not seem to fare well within the 
international legal framework. The sovereign nation-state—as 
represented by a national government—has long been the pillar of 
the international legal order.267 This was affirmed in one of the 
earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases, Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon.268 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that a nation’s 
sovereignty is “exclusive and absolute” within its territorial 
jurisdiction, such that any limitation on a sovereign nation, even by 
international law, can only be consented to by the sovereign itself.269 
It is reasonable to infer that such absolute sovereignty could be 
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speaks with one voice;270 that is what prompted the  warning in 
Holmes that “conflicting exercises of the same power [by the states] 
would not be well calculated to preserve respect abroad or union at 
home.”271  
Moreover, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)—officially recognized by the U.S. as constituting binding 
customary international law272—governs only treaties between 
nation-states, without mention of nonstate actors.273 Yet some 
international legal jurists have noted that the VCLT does not rule 
out the validity of other forms of international 
agreements.274Article 6, which emphasizes nation states as treaty-
making entities, “must be read as indicative of the type of entities 
covered by the Treaty rather than as indicative of the only entities 
capable of concluding treaties at international law.”275 More to the 
point, a draft proposal of the VCLT “considered the possibility of 
various other subjects entering into treaties alongside nation-
states.”276 A comment by the drafting International Law 
Commission notes: 
There is no rule of international law which precludes 
the component States from being invested with the 
power to conclude treaties with third States. 
Questions may arise in some cases as to whether the 
component State concludes the treaty as an organ of 
the federal State or in its own right. But on this point 
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also the solution must be sought in the provisions of 
the federal constitution.277 
 
In fact, the foremost institutions and instruments of international 
law seem to at least tacitly concede this point. The Soviet republics 
of Ukraine and Belarus were parties to the United Nations Charter 
and full-fledged U.N. member states, despite being subnational 
entities of the federated Soviet Union, which was also a Charter 
party and U.N. member.278 The Paris Agreement, while only 
recognizing state parties, does provide that nonstate entities, 
including subnational units, can lodge their commitments with the 
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA).279 It also has 
language acknowledging the “multiscale dimensions” of addressing 
climate change and the need to build capacity “at all levels of 
government.”280 
Notwithstanding the high-profile response by the U.S. Climate 
Alliance to the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, it was not the first time that subnational entities 
continued American commitments to an international agreement in 
lieu of the national government. When the U.S. similarly failed to 
ratify another climate change treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, roughly 
185 cities across the country issued unilateral declarations that 
implemented or expressed support for its provisions.281 Nothing in 
the Kyoto Protocol precluded local and state governments from 
taking these actions, nor is there any indication that the U.N. or any 
other international body disputed their right to do so.282 The 
previously mentioned unilateral declarations concerning other U.N. 
treaties the U.S. declined to ratify—such as the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—also 
garnered little opprobrium or pushback from the U.N.283 
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Although largely symbolic compared to other instruments of 
international law, these declarations and nonbinding agreements 
nonetheless reflect a major shift in the international legal order.284 
“The fact that there might be treaties between states and other 
international entities should only be surprising to those who still 
imagine treaties as being the highly formal agreements between 
monarchs otherwise living in a quasi-state of nature mainly 
controlled by customs and force.”285  
Indeed, the very idea of a nation-state exercising what is 
sometimes called “Westphalian sovereignty” derives from, and is 
named after, a mid-seventeenth century agreement that predates the 
advent of federalism, constitutional republics, and rapid 
globalization.286 National sovereignty is no longer vested in 
monarchs and other absolute rulers, and international agreements 
are thus no longer established to maintain “the conditions for 
internal governance by protecting polities from external 
interventions.”287 Thus, “international law as a whole has evolved 
from a system mostly based on custom to a system embodied in 
treaties.”288 In the seventy-five years since the United Nations was 
established, its nearly 200 member states have concluded 200,000 
treaties and agreements between them, governing an array of matters 
from water resource management and foreign investment, to space 
exploration and freedom of navigation on the high seas.289 (These 
are just the agreements officially registered with the U.N.). 
 
B. Subnational Foreign Relations for Twenty-First Century 
Challenges  
Factoring in the advent of globalization and the emergence of 
unprecedented global threats like climate change, Westphalian 
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sovereignty and “treaty formalism” may do more harm than good 
when it comes to accomplishing all sorts of objectives for the public 
good: cultural exchange and mutual understanding, trade and 
commerce, scientific and humanitarian cooperation, and so on. 290 
This has led to calls for a “new international law”291—sometimes 
called “cosmopolitan law” or “world law”292—characterized by a 
“global civil society” that provides nonstate actors, including 
individuals, the opportunity to “participate in social and cultural 
activities that reach beyond the nation.”293 This is critical given that 
“[international] relations are now a necessary aspect of any state’s 
governance.”294 Parag Khanna, a prominent international relations 
scholar, argues that the increasingly fractured, complex, and chaotic 
nature of the global order warrants a “mega-diplomacy” 
characterized by coalitions of local, subnational, and national 
governments in partnership with private actors.295 
Subnational Foreign Relations is exploding across the world for 
the same reason there exist over 200,000 international treaties and 
agreements:296 The world is changing rapidly and becoming ever 
more complex, and there is a myriad of issues on which 
communities at all levels must work together. Many of these 
problems are too large for one nation to handle—such as climate 
change, water scarcity, terrorism, and economic instability—and 
they subsequently impact subnational polities of all sizes, regardless 
of what the national government does (or does not) do. 
Thus, although international law recognizes that state 
X has a legal personality, this in itself is not sufficient 
to demonstrate that it is the only entity to do so within 
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its territory. In other words, the international status 
of the whole of a Federation does not in itself 
preclude its federated states from also having a form 
of international legal personality. Indeed, 
international law does not preclude federations 
from being composed of multiple overlapping 
legal personalities. Therefore, even if a Federation’s 
constitution was bound by internal rules to respect 
international law, in no way does international law 
force such Federation to possess only one single 
international personality for all possible purposes 
(emphasis added).297 
 
In response to the rapidly changing paradigm of international 
law, some advocate for a “new sovereignty” to replace the 
antiquated Westphalian model.298 This can take many forms, from 
“transnational networks of government officials” to judges citing 
“precedents from other countries and international tribunals.”299 
Echoing Justice Louis Brandeis’ exaltation of states as laboratories 
of “novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country,” subnational entities of all shapes and sizes could 
serve a similar purpose with respect to international law and political 
issues.300  
This Note argues that Subnational Foreign Relations is yet 
another rendition of this new twenty-first century sovereignty, one 
that recognizes the fact that globalization means “we live in a time 
when the walls of sovereignty are no protection against the 
movements of capital, labor, information, and ideas.”301 Nor does 
sovereignty protect against threats and challenges too big, disparate, 
and complex for national governments to handle on their own—or 
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too important to leave at the whim of rancorous national electoral 
politics.302  
SFR is not only consistent with international law, but also with 
the U.S. Constitution’s conception of, and relationship with, 
international law.303 The American Revolution was in many respects 
a revolt against the Westphalian model of sovereignty vested in a 
singular monarch or government.304 The U.S. Declaration of 
Independence asserted that government power comes from “the 
Consent of the Governed,” which the people could change, abolish, 
or replace altogether.305 This idea of “popular sovereignty,” once 
ahead of its time, is now a foundational element for the vast majority 
of the world’s nation-states (at least in principle, if not in practice). 
Concurrent with the expansion of democratic principles worldwide, 
it may be time to broaden this pillar of human governance to 
encompass our burgeoning global community: “Popular sovereignty 
assumes that sovereign powers can be shared, divided, and limited 
without giving up on the entire system” of international law.306 SFR 
allows the people—through their cities, states, and even civil society 
groups—to exercise their constitutional right to self-expression 
(adopting international human rights standards or declaring 
solidarity and amity with a foreign people) and to self-governance 
(managing local concerns such as water and electricity in concert 
with foreign neighbors), albeit within the reasonable confines of the 
Constitution previously articulated above. 
As Henkin observes, states inevitably “touch foreign affairs 
even in minding their proper business,” since federalism gives states 
co-jurisdiction over the lives and activities of foreign nationals.307 
This unavoidably influences U.S. foreign relations, as first tested by 
Virginia’s inadvertent venture into foreign affairs in Ware v. 
Hylton.308 But even the routine laws, policies, and regulations of a 
state impact foreign nationals and entities, who must engage with 
state offices and courts to reside, do business, or seek legal remedies 
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within the state. Hence, despite the Constitution’s ambivalent and 
ambiguous demarcation of state-federal domains in foreign affairs, 
it is practically impossible to separate subnational influence from 
the national government’s foreign relations—especially in an era 
characterized by increasing movement of capital, people, and goods 
between the U.S. and the world. 
In short, international law offers no restrictions on Subnational 
Foreign Relations, which is consistent with the foundational 
American principle of popular sovereignty, and which “nudge the 
nation back to federalism’s early days …. in which the states played 
a much larger role internationally.”309 Ostensibly, even skeptics and 
critics of international law could find merit in this originalist 
approach to state and local power abroad. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia once 
observed that while “[o]nce we saw issues and problems through the 
prism of a village or nation-state …. [n]ow we see the challenges of 
our time through the world’s eye.”310 Though he was referring to 
lawyers and judges, his statement could just as well apply to 
humanity as a whole. Even in the most authoritarian, nationalistic, 
or isolationist countries, the common person living in provinces, 
counties, cities, and even rural villages is more interconnected than 
ever.311 The world is on the cusp of developing into a truly global 
civilization, with a shared human identity that transcends the 
traditional confines of culture, religion, ethnicity, and political 
identity.  
Far from idealistic or Utopian, this development reflects the 
sober reality that, whatever our multitude of differences, our species 
shares common existential problems and concerns that well exceed 
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the structural or legal frameworks of whatever country they happen 
to be born in. Aside from the more familiar and emblematic example 
of climate change, these concerns include the basics of human well-
being and survival: Access to food, water, healthcare, economic 
resources, and more. All these issues and more are subject to an 
ever-growing array of nonbinding, informal, or otherwise extra-
constitutional agreements, concluded not only by nation states, but 
by international organizations, nongovernment organizations, civil 
society groups, and subnational units of varying shapes, sizes, and 
labels.  
The U.S. Constitution, which has endured longer than the 
written constitution of any other nation, has long benefited from its 
versatility and ability to “respond to developing circumstances.”312 
As this Note has hopefully demonstrated, the Constitution is 
adaptable to the challenges and realities of this rapidly globalizing 
century, namely the burgeoning relationships between Americans 
and their foreign counterparts, which are no longer constrained by 
the barriers of old—not even the federal government. After two 
centuries of courts never striking down SFR—and not for lack of 
opportunity—and an equally long period of both congressional and 
executive acquiescence, federal administrations should conform to 
constitutional language, state practice, and consistent judicial 
rulings allowing states broad discretion to engage in the 
international realm.  
Not only would such conformity be legally and politically 
sound, but it also would reap a range of practical and moral benefits: 
The United States could reclaim its standing as a responsible and 
engaged member of the international community; the people would 
have an outlet to express views and values otherwise unattainable 
through the comparatively more distant mechanisms of the federal 
government; and some of the most pressing problems facing the 
nation and the world can be addressed through hundreds of 
thousands more flexible, responsive, and bolder “laboratories” that 
make up the U.S. and almost 200 other nations.  
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